quainted with the psychology developed by German philosophers. Mere experience was not sufficient for him to be able [to] see these profound doctrines in connection with one another (p. 147; the correction is mine).
Much of the volume's content is of an aesthetic order, and dramatic lines taken from Cicero, Shakespeare, Corneille, and others are compared for their emotive effect: it thus invites an aesthetic response. Partly owing to the difficulty of translating philosophical German, and, all the more so, eighteenth-century philosophical German, the work is neither altogether easy nor pleasurable to read. Not infrequently, the translator simply transposes the German into English. "Poking my eye in their direction" is, for instance, an odd rendition of "dahin mein Auge zu dringen" (p. 147). More worrisome for the reader, however, is the early encounter with a nonsensical paragraph (the last paragraph of Mendelssohn's preface); at the risk of being pedantic, it should read: "I am not disinclined to add some more parts to this collection of philosophical writings if the approval of the public encourages me to devote my spare hours more to the tedious work of revising than to the pleasure of reading and thinking" (not "I am not inclined to add some more ..." [p. 6] ).
Fortunately, the rest of the translation is reliable enough, leaving little doubt that this is a volume that a student of German philosophy and the Enlightenment will find useful.
SYLVANA TOMASELLI University of Cambridge Moral Understandings: A Feminist Study in Ethics
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In Moral Understandings} Margaret Urban Walker presents merely a template for a moral theory that is expressive-collaborative, culturally situated, and practicebased. It is expressive-collaborative because it reflects the responsibilities we have to each other, and is the product of agreement. It is culturally situated because it speaks to different responsibilities we have that are grounded in gender, race, class, and so on. And it is practice-based because its content is determined by actual practices of responsibility.
In general, the book contains numerous insights which can be found especially in Walker's discussions of feminism and how it should fit into our moral theory. Her goal is an excellent one, and much needed in philosophers' development of our moral theories: she wants to show how moral theorizing can eliminate oppression, coercion, exclusion, and disregard for some persons which, she believes, cannot be eliminated merely by endorsing an impartialist morality. While this is indeed an admirable goal, unfortunately, this reader at least did not see clearly how it is incorporated into the ethic of responsibility that Walker offers. I would like to have seen some of her insights elucidated in much greater detail. As things stand, the discussions in which they occur contain vague concepts and weaker defenses of central positions-most notably regarding moral justification-than warranted, and the connection between the chapters is not apparent. Further, I suspect that some of her deep feminist insights, though wholeheartedly endorsed by feminists, will be lost on her non-feminist audience because she often does not supply examples or explanation when necessary. Although Walker herself admits that she will not likely persuade her opponents, a much more extensive elaboration of critical points could go a long way toward doing so. Her goal is too important for women and men alike for her not to put forward the strongest effort to persuade. Finally, I found her language at critical points to be vague and too metaphorical-in my view, simplicity sells the day. And the reader will undoubtedly be distracted by the overuse of parenthetical comments.
Three main related concepts are central to the book: responsibility, feminism, and justification. Walker states at the outset that her book is mainly about moral epistemology, including the justification of moral knowledge (p. 3). Moral knowledge, according to Walker, is "thoroughly enmeshed with social knowledge" (p. 4). She asserts: "The single most important claim of this book is that a lot of what we need in order to understand specifically moral judgments or principles goes beyond specifically moral matters. We need to understand asocial world. Practical reason is not pure" (p. 203).
Moral knowledge is not "unsituated," but instead informed by one's social context. Factors such as gender, race, class, disability, and the like, "matter profoundly for how people live" (p. 50), and shape the kinds of moral problems we experience. Walker takes particular note of the fact that women, especially those who are poorer and of non-European descent, have traditionally borne the burden of caring for those in need (p. 78). Gender, like race and class, is the basis for assignments of responsibility. Walker wants to base morality on "practices" of responsibility, including their assignment, refusal, deflection, and assumption. We can be responsible for many things, including goals, roles, actions and failures to act, outcomes, attitudes, habits, and traits (p. 94). Our responsibilities let us know what is required of us, put pressure on us to perform, and define our moral selves and relationships with others (p. 95). They arise from our interactions with those "whose interests are vulnerable to our actions and choices," that is, those who are dependent on us (p. 107). For Walker, there is no one correct conception of responsibility, but one that is variable with respect to time and place (p. 97). Most noteworthy, morality has to reflect and speak to culturally variable assignments of responsibility that are grounded in gender and other features.
Unfortunately, Walker does not offer much of a defense of her view of a responsibility-based morality. Granted, we all have responsibilities to and for others and perhaps even ourselves, but it is not clear why responsibilities should constitute the core of morality. Walker's argument could be strengthened by a discussion responding precisely to counterexamples showing that factors other than responsibilities (e.g., consequences or intentions) matter most to morality.
In all fairness, she does discuss Goodin's consequentialism, but rejects it mainly because it is likely to cause great expense to the majority for the benefit of the minority. But the discussion is vague and does not speak directly to her own view of morality. Later, in Chapter 6, she considers the views of Rawls, Williams, and Taylor, 2 and rejects each in favour of the ethic of responsibility. She rejects Rawls's conception of rationality as adopting and carrying out a life plan, for the reason that events occurring in a normal life, such as pregnancies and illnesses, unpredictable care of vulnerable and dependent persons, and poverty, interrupt one's life plan (p. 136). But Rawls could respond that no matter what fortuitous circumstances life sends our way, we would all still want to satisfy our desires: our over-arching life plan would not change. One's desires, though, and so one's constitutive life plan, may shift in response to changing circumstances in one's life but one could still be rational to seek to satisfy one's desires and so to carry out one's life plan. A life plan need not be static for it to be rational to carry it out.
Walker rejects Williams's view that to have a character just is to have projects and categorical desires with which a person gets identified, for the reason that this does not jibe with "any familiar sense of 'character'" (p. 140). Further, character serves no useful function beyond that served by desires and projects-it becomes an otiose concept. Walker may be right about Williams's view of character, but the real issue is what role desires and projects should serve in morality, and why they should be less central to morality than responsibility. Walker's view is that the central role plans and projects have played in contemporary moral theory reflects the social position of those who endorse them. They are middle-class values reflected in the ideal of the autonomous person who, according to Walker, many never come close to resembling (p. 151). Her version of morality, she believes, is better than Williams's because it is grounded in people's real lives since it is based on responsibilities we have to each other because of the relationships in which we find ourselves.
Another concern for Walker's account of an ethic of responsibility lies with the exact nature of our duties. Since she is not propounding a moral theory but a template or model of morality (whatever this means), we should not expect too much on this score (p. 7). Instead we find more or less developed ideas, including some of the following highlights. There are many statements to the effect that responsibility affirms who we are, reveals what we care about, and decides issues of judgement and blame (p. 16). Further, one person's responsibilities are not the same as another's: "not everyone is accountable to the same people, for the same things, in the same ways" (p. 201). Determining one's responsibilities at a given time involves knowing the person's history of trust, expectation, and agreement (p. 69), which are the "understandings" that she brings to the situation (p. 110). Morality is constructive (p. 62) in the sense that "our practices of responsibility are always open to revision" (p. 201) and that anything settled on is not necessarily right (p. 70). When moral problems arise, their solution should sustain the integrity of the parties and the terms of their relationship (p. 70). Sometimes we have to make hard choices, such as favouring those related to us instead of strangers (p. 112). The theory is supposed to avoid relativism, yet at the same time reflect the idiosyncratic position each one of us occupies. Any more detail about the content of the theory will have to be worked out.
A third concern is exactly how Walker's account of an ethic of responsibility is a feminist one. Both Chapters 7 and 8 contain interesting and insightful discussions of explicitly feminist issues. In Chapter 7, Walker discusses in depth the ancient Greeks' view of female v. woman and woman v. slave, and argues that, like slaves, women are coerced and not born into their demeaning position, but, unlike slaves, the coercion is not obviously against women's will and so is easily denied (p. 168). The harms done to women are systematized, normalized, and unrecognized (p. 163), so that when women resist their subordination, they are discredited, ignored, or seen as complainers (p. 167). Walker sees women's subordination as being the product of social processes that assign and perpetuate the necessary identification of certain traits with women. These identities become naturalized and normalized, and women as a result become (epistemically) marginalized (p. 167). The only normative connection I can force between these valuable insights and her view of morality is that presumably Walker's moral theory will not incorporate these identities. Nor will it rely on the "forms of graphy" she discusses in Chapter 8. Stereo-graphy (stereotyping) is the identification of the bodies of members of a group with a certain kind of soul, and results in generalizing and differentiating (p. 187). Porno-graphy is being ensouled as a generically sexualized subject (p. 190) . And necro-graphy refers to morbid images of groups, such as pictures of concentration camp victims. These images lead to a lesser moral regard for some people, taking the form of lesser respect or even abuse (p. 194) . Walker insists that these forms of graphing are the most effective ways of perpetuating damaging stereotypes. She wants these forms of graphing to be eliminated, but unfortunately does not show how an ethic of responsibility takes any steps toward doing so.
Aside from these explicitly feminist discussions, Walker contends that her view is feminist because it is "imbued with insights, commitments, and critical and interpretive techniques of feminist theories made by many women in the past decade" (p. 20). What this amounts to is not clear. I take a feminist moral theory to be one that has as one of its goals eradicating sexism. Recent feminist literature has much to say about the distinction between feminist and feminine moral theories, the latter being those that incorporate women's experiences without necessarily having the goal of eradicating sexism. Walker acknowledges this distinction in her critique of Carol Gilligan (p. 23), but comes dangerously close to proposing what appears to be merely a feminine moral theory.
This view comes out most clearly in her critique of Sidgwick's moral theory in Chapter 2. Sidgwick is one of the founders of the predominant "theoreticaljuridical" model of morality according to which there is an essential core of pure moral knowledge waiting to be discovered by moral philosophers (pp. 44, 37). Moral knowledge consists in a completely general moral theory similar to a scientific one whereby it can be expressed in teachable, law-like general propositions whose truth applies to everyone. Further, Sidgwick's kind of morality, shared by Rawls and Williams among others, seeks to preserve autonomy or enhance selfinterest in rule-bound voluntary interactions (p. 20) . Walker rejects this kind of theory because it is written for and represents only the few (men) who find themselves in positions of power and privilege, who engage mainly in interactions where preserving autonomy, promoting self-interest, and seeking a pure core of knowledge are the goals (p. 43). Walker takes the feminist insight to be the acknowledgment that the position from which moral philosophers such as Sidgwick speak is an idiosyncratic one, and does not, contrary to what these philosophers lead us to believe, represent the position of everyone (p. 22). Moreover, the ideals associated with this position get reproduced (p. 216).
Walker wants her own theory to reflect positions and experiences other than privileged ones, in particular, those of women, which historically have had to do with caring for dependents (pp. 19, 21) . Walker aims "to remedy the exclusion or distortion of women's lives in moral theory by representing understandings of value, agency, and responsibility embedded in practices that have been and still are 'women's work'" (p. 23). But this seems to make the theory feminine, but not feminist, since she proposes incorporating women's experiences, but not eradicating the sexist practices underlying them. Our hope is that the view she defends in Chapter 3 meets this objection. There she deems morality as constructive or negotiative, taking into account the interests of everyone and generating duties in accord with these interests yet not totally determined by them (p. 60). Perhaps the theory eradicates responsibilities that are grounded in sexist practices (e.g., removes the burden on women for childcare because they are deemed to be natural nurturers). But Walker never explicitly says this, and even refers several times to morality being based on the responsibilities people just happen to have (pp. 69, 105) .
Finally, I found the defense of her version of justification, the central theme of the book, to be weak. Walker favours a contextual alternative to the traditional view of pure moral knowledge learned by reflection (p. 66): we need to know who the agents are, how they understand themselves and each other, and how they got into the situation in order to know their duties. Moral justification takes place between people; we try to correct or offer alternatives to our reasons for action (p. 120). Although it is difficult to glean exactly what this involves, it has to do with requiring people to be accountable to each other for their actions (p. 114). Walker insists that one person's judgements do not extend authority to any other person (p. 208). But if others are not persuaded, the solution is to change their lives so that your judgements but not their own make sense to them (p. 207).
I wonder whether this version of justification is so weak that it would justify even Hitler's actions. It seems to imply that feminists cannot judge the actions of sexists.
3 In general, there is no easy way for us to know that our view is better than any other's. Walker says that "we have to hope our own moral floor is on higher ground" and must try to see to it that it is (p. 212). But on what basis do we judge? Each person-including the sexist-will insist that she is right, and I see no easy way out of a deadlock short of the non-philosophical one of attempting to change each other's lives. Unfortunately, then, the key concept of the book is inadequately defended. I hope that Walker will work out the details of her version of morality so as to achieve the extremely important goal she has set for moral philosophers. Notes 1 Henceforth, all page references to the book will appear in parentheses in the text. 2 I will not comment on the discussion of Taylor since I found it too vague to be useful. 3 A remark just a few pages later suggests otherwise: "If it is commonplace that the most obvious moral failings of human societies-cruelty, injustice, exploitation, oppression-are effected through systems of social difference, then to mount effective moral criticism of these arrangements requires finding out precisely how relations of trust and responsibility can be manipulated and deformed into something ugly and dangerous, in just this way" (p. 211).
